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FOREWORD
The term "jurimetrics" was introduced into the legal vocabulary by Lee Loevinger
about fifteen years ago. It signifies the scientific investigation of legal problems.
Although this field is presumably as vast as the law itself, jurimetric research has
up to now mainly concentrated on three areas: electronic data storage and retrieval;
behavioral analysis of decisions; and the use of symbolic logic. To some extent, each
of these areas is independent of the others. Electronic data processing is a response
to what might be termed the source material explosion-a proliferation of textual
materials which has been said to present scholars with the choice between reading and
writing. Behavioral research of the decision process reflects the growing selfconfidence of American social scientism.' The use of modern, sophisticated logical
methods in the analysis of legal problems can be traced to the spread of a formalistic
new school of philosophy, commonly associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, these three areas of jurimetric research are closely interconnected; they all
are, at least for present practical purposes, products of the "computer revolution."
Only the electronic computer, it seems, can cope with the continuing avalanche of
relevant source materials; only the computer, again, can efficiently undertake the
complicated calculations required for behavioral probability analysis. And the computer will not digest anything that cannot be dissected with logical consistency.
The following symposium discusses these three major areas of present jurimetric
activity. Although all three are manifestly of substantial if not revolutionary potential
significance to the legal profession, the hundred-odd American legal periodicals have
at least up to now neglected the discussion of jurimetrics to such an extent that there
is some temptation to think of a conspiracy of silence. This may be due to a feeling
that the jurimetric approach to legal problems is intrinsically unsound or dangerous,
or that this new science is not sufficiently advanced at the present to warrant general
attention. This attitude appears to be particularly strong in the area of behavioral
analysis of judicial decisions3 where the acrimony of discussion poses an apt parallel
to the veritably Manichaean chasm between theology and technology which currently
' See generally Dahl, The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a
Success/ul Protest, 55 Am. PoL. Smi. RFv. 763 (r961).
'CI. von Wright, Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Biographical Sketch, 64 P-L PC-L REV. 527 ('955).
'See especially Wiener, Derision Prediction by Computers: Nonsense Cubed-and Worse, 48 A.B.A.J.
Cf. Lawlor, What Computers Can Do: Analyss and Prediction of Legal Decisions, 49 id.
1023 (1962).
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divides political scientists into two warring camps. But as Spengler shows 5 -and,
indeed, Max Weber and his critics have revealed for some time-even the efficient
classification of materials and logical rigor are not generally regarded as unmixed
blessings.!
The anti-jurimetric arguments may or may not be valid; in any case, they do not
pre-empt the earnest discussion of a potentially important subject. It has therefore
been the Editor's endeavor to present as many sides of the subject as possible, and to
leave decisions as to the present or future utility of the various branches of jurimetrics
to the informed judgment of the reader. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to add
a few brief remarks with respect to some matters which, it is felt, might deserve some
additional attention.
First, even in seemingly as neutral an area as information storage and retrieval, an
"open" system-i.e., a system of total storage and complete search-might well result in
a major readjustment of substantive law as presently applied. This applies particularly
to those legal subjects which, like the conflict of laws, have for some reason or other
not been satisfactorily covered in a systematic manner by presently available indexing
procedures. Here, and in fields primarily regulated by substantially unlitigated and
poorly codified or compiled statutes, a total search might well produce sources of
indisputable authority which would unsettle (or, if a different jurisprudential
analysis is preferred, correct) what theretofore were assumed to be firmly established
rules of law. In the long run, of course, the effect of total search methods would be
stabilizing rather than unsettling. The courts would no longer be able to evolve
new rules of law merely by deliberately or accidentally overlooking inconvenient
prior decisions.
Secondly, if the open search system is established and cemented by the use of a
logically more consistent terminology, it almost inevitably will dictate the increasing
use of more unambiguous terms to the legislatures and to the judiciary, thereby
restricting and ultimately eliminating judicial legislation by distinction and reinterpretation.
'See, e.g., Schaar & Wolin, Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics: A Critique, 57 Am. POL. Scm.
and Storing, Strauss, Bern; Weinstein & Horowitz, Replies to Schaar & Wolin, id. at

REv. 125 (1963),
x5o-6o.
5

Spengler, Machine-Made justice: Some Implications, inIra, p. 36.
'Max Weber was quite aware -that streamlined categories employed for empirical analysis ("ideal
types") could easily be misunderstood as exact descriptions of reality. Weber, Die "Objelftivitdt" sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, I9 ARcHmV zila SOZIALWISSENSCCAFT UND SOZIALPOLIT5K 22, 77-78 (1904). For a criticism of Weber's insistence that personal "value judgments" be dimindtad from empirical analysis, see especially LEo Sm-RAMss, NATUPAL RIGHiT AND HIsToRY 34-80 (193).
The abstraction and refinement of Romanistic legal terminology has progressed so much in Germany
towards the end of the last century that a leading pandectist could earnestly state that the derision of legal
questions was the product of a calculation, with legal categories as the factors, and that only the completei.e., the theoretical-comprehension of legal categories would reveal the true legal system while at the
same time making for legal certainty. I BERNHARD WINDscHEiD, LEHBRUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS III
(9th ed. Theodor Kipp, 19o6). For a devastating satire of 4this approach, see Jhering, Im Himmel der
Begifisjurisprudenz, in RUDOLF VON JHEEING, SCHERZ UND ERNS IN DER. JUUSPRUDENZ 245-333 (9th
ed. 1904).
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It might be that candid judicial legislation is to be preferred, or that law making
by the courts should be restricted as much as possible. But given the basic facts of
life of the American legal and political system, ie., the "deadlock of democracy" in
Congress and the ephemeral and frequendy amateur character of most state legislatures 7 coupled with a basic political aversion against judicial legislation on
dubious but nevertheless potent jurisprudential and philosophical grounds, the
question remains whether camouflaged judicial legislation by creative forgetfulness8
or ambiguity is dispensable.
Thirdly, in the field of behavioral analysis and especially prediction of judicial
decisions, "feedback" and the "Heisenberg effect" would seem to merit more attention.
Decision analysis in terms of significant facts and actual outcome rather than the
language of judicial decisions was advocated more than three decades ago by Herman
Oliphant as a "return" to stare decisis. But as Llewellyn has pointed out, this
approach neglects those portions of the rhetoric of appellate opinions which are
intended to guide the lower courts in analogous cases not yet decided.9 This vital
point was somewhat drastically illustrated when the present symposium was being
edited.' ° Fred Kort and Reed Lawlor believed to have detected a measurable degree
of consistency in behavioralterms in the Supreme Court's handling of right-to-counsel
cases; most legal commentators thought that decisions in this area had become all
but arbitrary.'1 The remedy generally felt appropriate was the overruling of Betts
v. Brady,12 an action recommended by no less than twenty-two state attorneys general
and taken by a unanimous Supreme Court.' 3 However, had the Supreme Court
been impressed by the behavioral analysis of its decisions in the right-to-counsel area,
it might have adopted the criteria of adjudication discovered by such research, and
rSee JAms MACGREGOR BURNS, ThE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY-FOUR-PARTY

POLrrTCs IN AMERICA

(1963); Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 CoLum.
L. REv. 787 (x963).
Some almost ubiquitous obstacles to the clarity of statutory language are
the necessity for political compromise which places a premium on the use of ambiguous language; the
practice of political interest groups to "manufacture" evidence of legislative intent; and the legislative
process itself, which permits additions and deletions by amendment without regard to terminological or
systematic consistency. Few states can boast of the facilities described by MacDonald, Legal Research
48 CoRNE..
Translated Into Legislative Action-The New York Law Revision Commission r934-x963,
L.Q. 401 (1963). The obstacles to statutory clarity described supra also exist on the state level. Furthermore, North Carolina, for instance, does not even keep verbatim reports of legislative sessions.
' Cf. Schneider, The Category of Ignorance in Sociological Theory, 27 Am. Soc. REV. 492 (z962).
'Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 6 AM. LAw SCHOOL REV. 215 (1928); KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
ThE COMMON LAW TRADiTmoN-DECIDING APPEALs 14 n.9 (I960).
"It should be pointed out here that none of the predictions made in contributions to this symposium
have been revised in the light of subsequent events. The manuscript of Schubert, Judieial Attitudes and
Voting Behavior: The 5961 Term of the Supreme Court, infra, p. ioo, was received on November 26,
z962, and has not been subsequently revised as to matters of substance.
1"Kort, PredictingSupreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the "Right-toCounsel" Cases, 5 Am. PoL. Sc. REv. I (1957) (the pioneering study); references to legal authors in
Kort, Simultaneous Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of Judicial Decisions, infra, pp. 143,
159-6o n.13; Lawlor, supra note 3, at 342-44.
2316 U.S. 455 (942).
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Cf. Lawlor, supra note 3, at 344-
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applied them from then on. The result would have been an ossification of that
area of the law: behavioral observation would be "fed back" as the norm.
Finally, there remains the question whether in a judicial system not yet stratified
by logically compelling terminology, total recall, and/or behavioral feedback, the
behavioral analysis of appellate decisions will produce anything but ephemeral
results (in a stratified system of adjudication, behavioral analysis would presumably
be superfluous). The opponents of behavioral analysis and prediction in this area,
curiously enough, engage in analysis which would in all probability measure up to
sophisticated social science standard. But, as Ulmer observes, the Miracle of Rodell"4
depends on his own insights and did not produce "replicable" knowledge."6 The
same observations probably apply to Wiener's outstanding success as an appellate
advocate. 6
It might very well be that in a viable and flexible legal system, accurate behavioral
analysis of appellate decisions will never become a transmissible art. The law
might change too fast, or the records or the opinions (or both) might be too bare,
to permit the exact recordation of anything but history. After all, this is neither
so unusual nor necessarily conducive to uncertainty of the law. The parlements of
the Ancien Regime prohibited the publication of their opinions; the Supreme Court
of Denmark gives cryptic and all too brief explanations for its decisions; the Supreme
Court of Turkey decides so many cases in so many panels by unpublished opinion
that a formal analysis of its decisional law is all but impossible. 7 Yet it might be
assumed with some degree of assurance that in all three instances the relatively small
number of highly competent appellate counsel developed and maintained a high
degree of predictive skill through constant practice and observation. And it might
very well be that in any dynamic system of adjudication, this supreme skill of appellate
advocacy is attainable but not transmissible.
HANS W. BAADE.
1'Rodell, For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing, 5o GEo. L.J. 700, 707-o8 (1962)
accurately predicted the outcome as well as the votes of seven out of eight justices in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (x962). Unfortunately, a tragic accident in his family prevented Professor Rodell from participating in this symposium. The papers of Schubert, Kort, and Ulmer were intended in part as an anticipated response to his views.
" Ulmer, Quantitative Analysis of judicial Processes: Some Practical and Theoretical Applications,
infra, pp. x64, z65 n.4.

"0See Wiener, supra note 3, at 1027-28. However, many skills of appellate advocacy other than a
sound instinct for the prediction of results obviously can be transmitted; see generally FREDERIcx BEnNAys
WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARoUNG FEDERAL APs'_ALs (1961), and Sobeloff, Book Review, 40 N.C.L. REv.
822 (1962).

Nevertheless, a law-trained behavorist like Oliphant can also be victorious, as he was in

Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, 131 Misc. 682, 227 N.Y. Supp. 258 (Sp'l Term N.Y. Co. 1928).
See Carey & Oliphant, The Present Status of the Hitchman Case, 29 CoLIum. L. REV. 441 , 455-59 (1929),
and LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 391.
" Sauvel, Histoire du iugement motivi, [1955]

REVUE Du DROIr PUBLIC 5, 30-43; Marcus, Die

Rechtsprechungstnethode des dinischen Obersten Gerichtshois, 21 ZErsCIIRIIT FUR AUSLANDISOES Utn
INTERNArIONALES PRIVATRECHT 243 (1956); DEmwAt KALEN & ILHAN ARSEL, CIVIL lAIATION IN TUitxzy
136-40 (x957).

